Education: A More Powerful Weapon Than War? by Thomas, Maja K.
Student Publications Student Scholarship
Fall 2015
Education: A More Powerful Weapon Than War?
Maja K. Thomas
Gettysburg College
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Curriculum and Social Inquiry Commons, International and Area Studies Commons,
International and Comparative Education Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and
the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
This is the author's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the
copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/
400
This open access student research paper is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Thomas, Maja K., "Education: A More Powerful Weapon Than War?" (2015). Student Publications. 400.
https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/400
Education: A More Powerful Weapon Than War?
Abstract
In this paper, I analyze the impact of education on civil war onset, utilizing variables measuring length of
compulsory education and number of internal armed conflicts in a given country per year. Using data from the
Quality of Government Institute’s Quality of Government Standard Time Series data set, I test this hypothesis
and find that an increase in compulsory education length decreases the expected number of internal armed
conflicts. The results suggest further importance of education as a great equalizer among individuals as well as
nations.
Keywords
compulsory schooling, education, civil war, armed conflict, political economy
Disciplines
Curriculum and Social Inquiry | Education | International and Area Studies | International and Comparative
Education | Military and Veterans Studies | Peace and Conflict Studies
Comments
This paper was written for Professor Caroline Hartzell's course, POL 351: The Political Economy of Armed
Conflict, Fall 2015.
This student research paper is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/
student_scholarship/400
 
  
Education: A More Powerful Weapon 
Than War? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maja Thomas 
Professor Hartzell 
 The Political Economy of Armed Conflict 
Fall 2015 
  
  2 
I. Introduction 
Scholars are increasingly interested in understanding the causes of civil war due 
to their inherent devastating social and economic consequences. If there exists a negative 
relationship between compulsory education and onset of civil conflict, this would send a 
strong signal to governments about their policies and the value of education. Education is 
highly valued at a community level, yet often neglected in governmental policy despite 
being an important indicator of the economic development of a nation.  
Certainly the United States has been criticized for spending a small percentage of 
its annual budget on education, but many countries do not even provide free compulsory 
education to their populations. This has been a substantial concern to the United Nations, 
which set education as one of the Millennium Development Goals, stating that it wished 
to ensure that by 2015 children were able to complete a full course of primary schooling1. 
As of 2015, primary education in developing regions has reached 91%, but there are still 
gains to be made in primary as well as secondary education, where only 66% of 
secondary school-aged children are enrolled2.  
Nelson Mandela was once quoted as saying, “education is the most powerful 
weapon in which you can use to change the world”3. These words may be even truer than 
the former South African President had intended when he spoke at the University of the 
Witwatersrand in 2003. Education is an undeniably important factor for increasing the 
output and developmental capacities of a nation, but if it were also shown to have a 
                                                        
1 "United Nations Millennium Development Goals." UN. UN, n.d. Web. 
2 "School Enrollment Index, Secondary (% Net)." The World Bank Database. UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, n.d. Web. 
3 Nelson Mandela. July 2003. Address delivered at launch of Mindset Network. 
Planetarium, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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negative impact on the onset of armed conflict, it would bring further weight to the 
discussion and give additional incentives for nations to expand their educational policies. 
It could also partially explain a decrease in the number of new armed conflicts over the 
past few decades as universal education has become an important topic in the 
international community and therefore increased among nations. Lastly, the findings of 
this paper could serve to warn the international community that states with largely 
uneducated populations may become potential hotspots for armed conflict.   
This paper seeks to explore whether an increase in the length of compulsory 
education decreases the number of internal armed conflicts that a country is likely to 
experience in a given year. In the next section, I will discuss the relationship between 
education and conflict. In section III, I will use a Poisson regression to analyze this 
question in the context of internal armed conflicts per year. In section IV, I will discuss 
the data collected to test my hypothesis, and in section V I will use that data to test my 
hypothesis and find evidence that an increase in the length of compulsory education 
negatively impacts the number of internal armed conflicts in a country per year. After 
completing a robustness check, I will conclude that there is a significant negative 
relationship between compulsory education length and number of internal armed 
conflicts. 
 
I. The Dynamics of Education and Conflict 
The interaction between education and conflict has attracted interest from scholars 
for many decades. Much of this attention has focused on the damaging effects of 
participation in violent conflict on education and educational outcomes (Benshalah et. al 
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2000, Lai and Thyne 2007, Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011).  Scholars have found 
violent conflict to cause a drop in school enrollment rates, largely due to inaccessibility 
of resources or fear of attack. Children that have been exposed to armed conflict are less 
likely to continue their education after the conflict is over, are less able to overcome 
social obstacles, and more likely to live in poverty. It is no secret that armed conflict has 
a negative effect on many facets of the societies it permeates and those detrimental 
effects on the educational system are well documented. However, it was not until more 
recently that research shifted to focusing on the effects of education on conflict.  
Why would education influence conflict? There are many theories as to the nature 
of this relationship, but one of the most widely accepted has been documented by Clayton 
Thyne (2006). In his research, he reasons that education allows individuals to develop 
skills needed for the workplace. With more education leading to more skilled workers, 
the host economy in question experiences growth. While this growth may not necessarily 
be sustainable in the long run, it does lead nations to become wealthier and build stronger 
economies. This, in turn, reduces the probability of conflict onset, since richer nations are 
less likely to engage in civil war. This theory is indirectly backed by Thyne’s data; testing 
primary and secondary male enrollment and education expenditures, he finds that there is 
a significant impact of education on decreasing the probability of conflict onset. Barakat 
and Urdal (2009) test male secondary school enrollment on low intensity conflict 
outbreak and find similar results; education lowers the risk of conflict onset. 
Other research has exposed an inequality argument as a major influence of 
education on conflict. Much the explanation has been based upon an inequitable quality 
of education, rather than the quantity of education received. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) 
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found that discriminatory curricula significantly contributed to violence. This is due to 
unequal opportunities for students, which create grievances as groups experience relative 
deprivation when seeing the opportunities available to students attending the higher 
quality schools. These grievances then lead to a greater likelihood of conflict onset. This 
theory can also be applied to the amount of schooling a student is able to receive. Barriers 
such as cost, distance, and a need to participate in the workforce, often dictated by 
socioeconomic status, may also heighten grievances among the disenfranchised group 
and lead to a greater likelihood of conflict. 
 Furthermore, as suggested by Barakat, education is generally expected to 
increase the opportunity cost of joining rebel forces. These opportunity costs might not 
decrease grievances, but they do impact ones decision to forgo a generally greater earning 
opportunity to engage in conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) infer that rebellion is less 
likely and rebel recruitment more costly in more highly educated societies. Edgar and 
Ray (2008) find that when groups have a near-zero opportunity cost, the political system 
within that country will almost certainly be challenged. This would also explain the 
increase in conflict onset probability in societies with youth bulges, which have been 
found to frequently suffer from employment shortages (Moller 1968, Huntington 1996, 
Cincotta et al. 2003).  
As discussed above, there exists substantial literature detailing the relationship 
between education and conflict. Yet while increased education is generally accepted to be 
a positive factor mediating conflict onset, this information does little to impact policies. 
Identifying more specifically what forms of education and under what conditions reform 
is successful in mediating conflict may help to instruct states how best to improve their 
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educational systems, rather than imply a trial and error approach within a certain field. 
Most of the previous literature utilizes enrollment statistics as a method to examine the 
relationship between education and civil conflict, which provide little clarity regarding 
how best to increase education access and quality through governmental policies. 
Furthermore, many of these studies look solely at male enrollment, believing that men are 
more likely to join rebel forces than women. While looking at enrollment percentages at 
various levels is a strong predictor of a general impact of male education, it does not 
strongly suggest concrete policy implications without risk of major gender 
discrimination. Additionally, the usage of enrollment statistics might be skewed by 
socioeconomic status, which would not adequately describe the impact that education has 
on conflict, but a mix of education and wealth. Østby and Urdal (2010) recommend an 
implementation of policies that reduce educational inequality. However, Østby and Urdal 
do not test nor advocate for any specific measures to diminish this inequality, again 
providing little direction for those who wish to implement programs on how to go about 
doing so. 
The findings of the length of compulsory education for both genders on number 
of conflicts in a given year, if statistically significant and negative, could suggest a direct 
policy option: increasing (or implementing) compulsory education laws. While similar to 
enrollment percentages, it tests the policy operative and includes policies which may not 
be strongly enforced. Furthermore, other scholars have not significantly explained the 
impacts of length of compulsory education on conflict onset. The results of this paper 
thus attempt to fill this gap in the literature and recommend a specific policy option to 
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institutions if compulsory education length is discovered to have a pacifying effect on 
number of conflicts in a country during a given year. 
 
II. Explanation and Hypothesis 
When tested, the model constructed in this section attempts to demonstrate a 
significant negative relationship between the number of years of compulsory education 
within a country and the number of internal armed conflicts per year in that country 
during that year. The hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
HA: 𝛽1 < 0 
An increase in the length of compulsory education decreases the number 
of internal armed conflicts that a country is likely to experience in a given 
year.  
 It would be rational for education to have a pacifying effect on armed conflict for 
four reasons. First, a focus on education, even if not a monetary commitment, sends a 
signal from the government to the public that the state is interested in improving their 
lives. This, in turn, would lower grievances, resulting in a lower probability of conflict 
emerging and likely increasing the probability of populations to act on grievances using 
non-violent methods. Second, education may allow for groups to develop important skills 
that help to settle disputes in a peaceful manner, which would again reduce the 
probability that grievances would lead to conflict. Third, education’s role as a ‘great 
equalizer’ allows individuals to overcome obstacles faced by socioeconomic status or 
other identities that do not allow them as much opportunity as others in society. 
Increasing the number of years of mandatory education would then decrease the gap 
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between educated and uneducated. This would then diminish potential grievances 
resulting from societal inequality, and decrease the probability of armed conflict arising. 
Lastly, education allows for greater opportunity, higher wages, and positive social 
mobilization, which may increase the opportunity costs of engaging in political violence 
or being recruited by rebel organizations. 
Due to the fact that the dependent variable is a count variable, the OLS regression 
is not appropriate estimator of the model, as the error term would have to include a 
conditional Bernoulli distribution. Therefore, to test this hypothesis, I will use a Poisson 
regression with the vce(robust) option to control for mild violation of underlying 
assumptions in the event that heteroskedasticity is present in the simple model. I will test 
the effect of education length on the number of internal armed conflicts, controlling for 
other outside influences. The constructed model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐿 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐶𝑅𝐸 𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶 𝐿𝐸𝑇 +         𝛽4𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑅 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +         𝛽6 𝐿𝐶𝐺𝐸𝑅𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +  𝜇  
where; 
o CONFLICT represents the number of internal armed conflicts within a 
country during a given year; 
o 𝛽𝑗  are the estimated parameters; 
o EDUCATION LENGTH is the number of years of compulsory education 
within a state; 
o REGIME TYPE is a polity scale ranging from strongly democratic to 
strongly autocratic; 
o REAL GDP represents real gross domestic product in constant prices 
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o ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is the probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic 
group;  
o RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION is the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same 
religious group; 
o GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION represents the share of government 
consumption at current purchasing power parities; 
o 𝜇 is the error term. 
Further information on the sources, time frames, and assumptions of the 
independent and dependent variables can be found in the following section.  
 
III. Data 
 The data used in this study come from the Quality of Government Institute’s 
Quality of Government Standard Time Series data set (QoG). The unit of analysis in this 
data set is country-year (e.g. United States-2014, United States-2015) and data is 
compiled between 1946 and 2014. The QoG draws from a number of available data 
sources to create a comprehensive source with over 2,000 variables and is broken into the 
following categories: quality of government, public economy, private economy, 
education, health, welfare, judicial, political system, elections, environment, energy and 
infrastructure, conflict, media, and migration. 
The dependent variable employed in this paper is the number of internal armed 
conflicts. The data was prepared by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the 
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International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Internal armed conflict is defined as 
conflict that “occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition groups without intervention from other states”4. The data set records the 
number of internal armed conflicts per country in a given year. There is no distinction 
between colonial and imperial wars. The data set spans between 1946 and 2013, 
documenting 164 countries and 2379 observations. The dependent variable does not take 
into account interstate armed conflicts, due to more complexities with different actors and 
educational levels of the other countries which could confuse the results of the coefficient 
and its meaning.  
The independent explanatory variable in this study is the duration of compulsory 
education, measured in years. The data comes from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The data set spans between 1998 and 
2013, representing 183 countries and 2576. Compulsory education is defined as a period 
of time in which peoples of a certain age are required to receive education and is 
mandated by law. 
Five control variables are utilized in the model: regime type, real GDP, ethnic 
fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and government consumption. Regime type 
represents a polity score; it is used for measuring the polity of the regime between 
strongly democratic, +10, and strongly autocratic, -10, governments. The data set was 
compiled by the Polity IV Project and looked at regime characteristics between 1800-
2013. The variable spans from 1946-2012, represents 182 countries and 8826 
                                                        
4 Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Soren Holmber, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann &Richard 
Svensson. 2015. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan15. University 
of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. 
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observations. The use of regime type as a control variable separates education length 
from regime type, since highly democratic nations are believed to experience less civil 
wars as people have non-violent means to addressing grievances. Research by Esteban 
and Rey (2008) support this relationship; finding that incidence of conflict depends 
critically on the ruling political system and their guarantee of peace. 
Real GDP represents a nation’s gross domestic product at constant 2005 national 
prices in millions of 2005 US dollars. The data, compiled by Penn World Table, includes 
years 1950-2011 and has 7541 observations in 169 countries. It is used to control for the 
wealth of a nation, since it has been demonstrated that wealthier nations are less likely to 
engage in internal armed conflict, regardless of other factors.  
Ethnic fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected people from 
a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group. The higher the probability, the 
more fractionalized the society. The data was compiled by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg as a measure of fractionalization. The data spans from 
1946-2012, with 189 countries and 9476 observations. The model controls for ethnic 
fractionalization because many scholars, including Horowitz (1985), have found it to be a 
contributing factor to conflict because ethnic groups provide an identity and allegiance in 
which people can rally around felt grievances. This is affirmed by the data, as the 
correlation coefficient between number of conflicts and ethnic fractionalization is 
significant and positive at 0.14034. 
Religious fractionalization reflects different religious groups within a given 
country. The higher the probability, the more fractionalized the country. The data 
includes 191 nations and 9533 observations, spanning from 1946-2012. It was created by 
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Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg. While the relationship between 
religious fractionalization and conflict is highly contested, some scholars have found it to 
decrease the probability of conflict onset due to a cohesion factor unseen by ethnic 
measures. It is negatively correlated with number of conflicts, with a coefficient of -
0.2114 and a p-value of 0.00, affirming the perceived relationship. Thus, the model 
preemptively controls for religious fractionalization. 
Government consumption is defined as the “share of output-based real gross 
domestic product per capita that is represented by government consumption, at current 
purchasing power parities”5. The data includes 7540 observations from 169 countries 
between 1950 and 2011 and was assembled by Penn World Table. Generally, nations 
with higher government consumption levels are wealthier, reducing the probability that 
conflicts will occur within the nation. Similarly, higher levels of government 
consumption may signal to the population that the government is interested in the 
wellbeing of its citizens, thereby reducing the probability that grievances will turn 
violent. This is supported by the negative correlation coefficient, -.0343, between the two 
variables. 
 
IV. Findings 
Table 1 displays the empirical tests of the hypothesis. The first column 
demonstrates the results of the model constructed in this paper; that is, the effect of an 
increase in the length of compulsory education on the number of internal armed conflicts 
                                                        
5 Government Consumption. 2015. Penn World Tables Dataset, version 8.0. Groningen 
Growth Development Centre, University of Groningen and the University of California, 
Davis.  
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in a country during a given year. Due to the nature of this test, it is not possible to predict 
a value increase or decrease in number of conflicts given an additional year of 
compulsory schooling. However, looking at my model, I find strong support for a 
negative relationship between the length of compulsory education and the number of 
internal armed conflicts, with a coefficient of -.217 and a p-value of 0.00. 
Other variables in the model that are similarly strong and significant are ethnic 
fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and real GDP. All three variables have p-
values less than 0.001.  Ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization both take 
on their predicted signs; that is, the model demonstrates a positive relationship with 
ethnic fractionalization (𝛽4 =1.841013) and a negative relationship with religious 
fractionalization (𝛽5 = -2.525794). Real GDP demonstrates a positive relationship, which 
is the opposite of what previous research and explanations have suggested. However, 
with a beta of 0.000000215, the coefficient may be too small to be definitively positively 
related to conflict. Regime type, significant at the 5% level, also takes on an unexpected 
value, with a positive coefficient. Furthermore, the coefficient for government 
consumption fails to attain significance in the model. 
The second model is used as a robustness check for the first. It tests whether the 
length of compulsory education affects the presence of internal armed conflict. Because 
the presence of conflict is measured as a dummy variable (0 for no conflict, 1 for 
conflict), model 2 uses the xtlogit command. Thus, the findings of model 2 are unable to 
be directly compared to those of model 1. However, the findings of the relationship 
between education and conflict in model 2 agree with those of model 1, giving further 
credibility to the results of model 1. 𝛽1, the coefficient of the length of compulsory 
  14 
education, is negative and significant, at -.21000896 and with a p-value of 0.034. 
Furthermore, all coefficients in model 2 displayed their predicted signs, with real GDP 
and regime type showing negative coefficients, unlike in the first model. However, it is 
worth stating that regime type was not significant at the 5% level. 
Noting my findings from model 1 and their agreement with the findings from 
model 2, I conclude that there is a significant negative relationship between length of 
compulsory education and the number of internal armed conflict within a given country 
per year. That is, I determine that education does indeed have a diminishing influence on 
the number of expected internal armed conflicts per year. 
 
V. Discussion 
Education has been touted as a great equalizer, and it may even diminish 
opportunity gaps outside of nations. The findings of this study suggest that by enacting 
longer compulsory education, states decrease the number of internal armed conflicts they 
are likely to experience per annum. The devastating effects of civil war are well known. 
Nations suffer from both a loss of physical and human capital, and economic growth is 
largely halted. Thus, conflict-ridden countries fall behind their less conflict-prone 
counterparts, increasing inequality among global actors.  
The findings from this paper suggest that increased education, seen through the 
length of compulsory education, lessens the likelihood that that a country will engage in 
civil war, which may help to close this global gap. These results are both good news as 
well as troubling: they add another dimension to the importance of education and give 
further incentives for nations to enact pro-education policies, yet also highlight the 
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cyclical dilemma into which nations enter once they experience armed conflict. If low 
quality or inaccessible education has a positive relationship with conflict onset, countries 
that engage in conflict are at risk of repeating the cycle, as education access and quality 
are often decreased after conflict occurs and countries with less education are more likely 
to engage in civil war. While this may help to explain why conflict-prone countries are 
disposed to to relapses, it does not help to mitigate this issue.  
However, it is worth noting that while the results from this paper indicate an 
explanation of this problem, further research would be needed to definitively conclude 
that the education-conflict cycle occurs. Additional research may also be necessary to 
further define the impact of education on conflict for different groups. This paper looks at 
compulsory education mandates for both genders and highlights the need for universal 
compulsory education and the enforcement of those mandates. Building on these results, 
testing an increase in compulsory education of males versus females, minority versus 
majority groups, or remote versus city populations on conflict onset may help nations 
further understand and identify which populations are particularly at risk of engaging in 
conflict. 
Nevertheless, the results of this paper definitively suggest that there are incentives 
for countries to increase their compulsory education laws. Education has many benefits, 
both for individuals and the societies in which they live. A reduction in the number of 
conflicts a country is likely to experience is just another gain added to this list. Nelson 
Mandela may have understood the value of education as a weapon, but likely did not 
realize the impact it has on influencing whether or not groups pick their weapons up. 
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VI. Appendix 
Table 1: Effects of length of compulsory education on internal armed conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable  (1) poisson 
Number of internal armed 
conflicts 
(2) xtlogit 
Presence of internal 
armed conflict 
 
Length of Compulsory 
Education 
 
Regime Type 
 
 
Real GDP 
 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
 
Religious Fractionalization 
 
 
Government Consumption 
 
 
 
N 
Pseudo R2 
Wald chi2(6)  
Prob > Chi2 
Log likelihood 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 
 
-.2165312 *** 
(.032859) 
 
.0210302* 
(.0125769) 
 
.000000215*** 
(.0000000325) 
 
1.841013*** 
(.237596) 
 
-2.525794*** 
(.229683) 
 
.1957575 
(.3720724) 
 
 
657 
0.1403 
 
0.000 
-533.54921 
 
 
-.2100896* 
(.0991222) 
 
-.0616384* 
(.0304693) 
 
-.000000206 
(.000000142) 
 
2.620486** 
(.8907308) 
 
-2.361634) 
(.9501577) 
 
-.0965345 
( 1.1611) 
 
 
1865 
 
37.39 
0.000 
-725.82187  
303.25 
 
   
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001   
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